ABSTRACT
Introduction
Brazil has historically presented a high inequality of income distribution, 4 which is the main determinant of the high poverty level in the country, being the average income level a secondary determinant, that is, the poverty level does not decline in a significant way when the country grows because the income gains are mostly appropriated by non-poor families. 5 Barros et al (2007b) show that without changes of the income inequality, the country should have presented a balanced growth of 14.5%
and of 22.0% to achieve the same observed reductions of poverty and extreme poverty levels from 2001 to 2005. Also, each decline of 1% in the inequality degree (Gini index) has the same impact on the poverty and extreme poverty levels that balanced growth rates of 2.4% and 4.0%, respectively. Thus, the falls in income inequality have stronger effects on poverty than the economic growth.
Brazil also presents significant levels of poverty and severe poverty. In 2005, around 34% (60 millions) and 13% (23 millions) of its population were poor and extremely poor. 6 Due to the income inequality and the large number of people under poverty condition, the Federal Government has been transferring income to these people as a way of a broad poverty alleviation strategy.
There are many kinds of income transfer programs in Brazil, such as Bolsa Família (BF),
Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC), 7 several retirement benefits and pensions, Abono PIS/PASEP
and Salário Família. This research will analyze the first two programs (BF and BPC), which are the main cash transfers programs specifically designed for poverty (and inequality) reduction.
The BPC is a constitutional right that aims to aid the elderly not included in the public social security system and the disabled people that cannot support themselves with their families' financial care, reaching 2.9 millions of Brazilians nowadays and expending the budget of R$11.63 billions (0.5% of GDP) in 2006. The benefit consists of one minimum wage (R$415/month) and the beneficiary's family per head monthly income must be less than a quarter of a minimum wage.
The Considering the existing information on inequality in income distribution for 124 countries, almost 95% of them present an income distribution less concentrated than the Brazilian one (Barros et al, 2006; Hoffmann, 2006a; and UNDP, 2006) . 5 See Barros et al (2001) . 6 Barros et al, 2007c. 7 Henceforth, respectively referred as BF and BPC.
These demand effects can be enhanced when we take into account the differences in the expenditure pattern of Brazilian families differentiated by income level. Among the poor urban Brazilian households, the food expenditure was 40% of the total consumption. On the other side, the Brazilian richest households' consumption standards are totally different, once their food expenditure was just 12 %, while health and education private services accounts for near 20% .
Also, the relevance of the general equilibrium effects is justified by the size and evolution of the On the other hand, we also expect that the program effects are sensitive to the budget sources that are financing this specific public expenditure. As mentioned before, the increased amount in the transfers were financed in specific ways. Also, during this period, some important changes were introduced in the fiscal system. For example, in the social security budget, the sharpest increase revenue came from PIS-COFINS taxes (increased 30% as ratio of GDP), which in 2003-2004 started to levy imports. Facts like this one changed the size and composition of the fiscal sources that are financing the programs and reinforce the general equilibrium impacts derived from the programs recent evolution.
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By other side, when the income of poor families increases, it is possible that this additional income can induce some people to reduce their labor offer and reducing their working hours. If this happens, the abovementioned effects induced by expending the transfers would be less than expected.
However, this negative effect of transfer on willingness to supply labor does not have empirical support until now. According to Medeiros et al (2007) , the rate of participation in the labor market among programs beneficiaries is 73% for the first poorest decile of distribution, 74% for the second and 76% for the third, while the same rate is of 67%, 68% and 71%, respectively, for people that live in households with no beneficiaries. These authors also evaluated the effects of BF on labor supply of four demographic groups: women head of family, women non-head of family, men head of family, and men 10 "Perfil das Famílias Beneficiárias do Bolsa Família". 11 In this research we identified in the Federal Brazilian Budget ("Orçamento Geral da União") the specific expenditure items related to the transfer programs. The first classification level for expenditure items is identified by a system of 4 digit codes, named "programas". For example, Bolsa Família has the code "1335" and can also be divided into a second classification level with more 4 digits, called "subprogramas". On the other hand, each "programa"/"subprograma" is earmarked with your own revenue source. In this case, it is a system of 3 digit identification code, called "fonte". See section 4 and Appendix D for more details about this subject.
non-head of family. They found that only the benefited women head of family has likelihood of participation in the labor market lower than similar non-benefited women.
CEDEPLAR ( , apud Medeiros, 2007 , also found positive effects of BF on labor supply.
According to it: (i) adults in households with beneficiaries presented a participation rate 3% higher than adults in households with no beneficiaries; (ii) the positive impact is higher among women, 4%, than among men, 3%; (iii) the program reduced the chances of women quiting their jobs in 6%. However, Tavares (2008) found evidence of an adverse effect of BF on willingness to labor market participation of benefited mothers. As we can see, there is some evidence that BF can reduce the participation in the labor market only for benefited mothers, and, even in this case, this effect is not consensual.
From the discussion above, it is clear that changes in transfer programs imply modification in both, relative prices and quantities that can be far from being negligible. In this sense, it is not unequivocal which would be the final prevailing effects. This work does not intend to prove that a specific methodology is unequivocally superior to others. Despite this, given the systemic consequences induced by the changes in these programs on markets and on financing sources, we believe that the usage of a CGE model integrated to a Microsimulation model (CGE-MS model), as presented in section 3, for evaluating the impacts of BF and BPC programs will generate information that will enhance the debate on the effects of these programs on poverty and inequality, once it will capture some systemic effects that are not considered by the methodologies used by other studies.
This paper is organized in more four sections, besides this introduction. The section 2 presents a brief literature review of the CGE-MS integration methodology. Section 3 describes the adopted methodology, including all the steps of CGE-MS integration and solution. The research questions, the implemented simulations and results are presented in the section 4. The last section presents the conclusion and the final remarks. Appendix A, B, and C supplement this paper with more details on the 
Review of literature on CGE and microsimulation integration.
The first assessments on the issue about the distributional and poverty effects of economic policies using CGE models was formally presented by Adelman and Robinson (1978) , that combined one of the first CGE model with the treatment of Income Distribution through a very disaggregated model. Dervis et al (1982) and Gunning (1983) followed the same path, with the introduction of new modeling techniques to this issue. After them, different approaches were developed and this section briefly presents some of their characteristics, and main advantages and drawbacks.
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In the CGE model with representative households (CGE-RH) approach, distributional analysis is performed by comparing the changes in income of these representative households (RHs) generated by the CGE model between the different groups of RHs or applying these changes to households' income in survey data to perform comparison between distributive indicators after and before the policy implementation. Poverty analysis is made by applying the change(s) of income of the RH(s) generated by the CGE model on household survey data to compare ex ante and ex post poverty indicators.
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Its disadvantages are either the assumption of no changes of intra-group income distribution, or that the changes of intra-group distribution change follows an exogenously fixed rule between the mean and the variance of the income distribution. This drawback is more serious when the analysis is performed with just one RH, when the impacts on poverty are evaluated by applying the change of the RH income on all households in the survey data. Thus, the intra-group nor the between groups effects are not captured, once it just changes the mean but not the variance of the distribution. Despite that, this approach can be easily implemented by simulating the economic policy with a CGE model and using the simulation outputs to make distributional and poverty analysis.
In the CGE model integrated multi-households CGE (CGE-IMH), as many households as are present in income and expenditure household surveys, or a large sample of them, are incorporated to the CGE model. 14 Compared to the CGE-RH, this method has the advantages of allowing changes in intragroup income distribution and not requiring pre-definition of household groups, giving more flexibility to po-verty and distributional analysis since the households grouping can be defined in many different ways. Nonetheless, the large size of the model can difficult its numerical solution and the conciliation of data from household income or expenditure surveys and national accounts, due to under or over reported variables in the household surveys.
According to Bonnet and Mahieu (2000, apud Savard, 2003) , the above limitations could be overcome by the usage of microsimulation which is required to analyze distributional effects. Thus, in order to better assess the distributional and/or poverty effects of economic policies, Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2003) presented a CGE model integrated to a micro-simulation (MS) model by 12 We are considering the same categories proposed by Savard (2003) , where more details can be found. 13 Dervis et al (1982 ), de Janvry et al (1991 , Chia et al (1994) , Decaluwé et al (1999a) , Colatei and Round (2001) and Agenor et al (2001) present evaluations based on this approach.
top-down method that permits to decompose the CGE results in their micro components. The CGE model is solved first and the changes of a vector of prices, wages, and aggregate employment variables are transmitted to the MS model, which calculates the variations in individual wages, self-employment incomes, and employment status that would consistent with the set of macro variables generated by the CGE model. In this sense, this top-down model permits to assess the distributive and the poverty impacts from the shock or the policy change simulated in the CGE model.
Despite providing richness in household behavior and presenting extreme flexibility in modeling specific behaviors, as households decisions and labor market switching rules, the reactions of households are not feed backed and, thus, are not taken into account by the CGE model. Thus, in order to achieve better assess of distributional and/or poverty effects of economic policies Savard (2003) and Muller (2004) proposed the methodology of using a CGE model linked to a micro-simulation model, with a bidirectional linkage between them that would guarantee a convergent solution for both models.
Methodology
This section describes the methodology used in this research. In the following three subsections are described the CGE model, the microsimulation model, and the integration between them.
The CGE Model
This section briefly describes some characteristics of the CGE model, as they are standard features, and emphasizes the presentation on the labor market, the household income formation process and the Government expenditure. Further details on it can be found in the Appendix A. Decaluwé et al (1999b) , Cockburn (2001) , and Boccanfuso et al (2003) applied this approach to perform poverty and income distribution analysis. 15 The CGE model used in this research is an extension from the one presented by Cury et al (2005) where further details can be found. This model results from a series of developments made in the model proposed by Devarajan et al (1991) , as can be seen in Cury (1998) , Barros et al (2000) and Coelho et al (2003) . 16 These 42 sectors are listed in Appendix A. The Government expenditure faces the fixed budget amount registered for the base year and according to a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
The Labor Market
Firms demand the seven types of labor, classified by contract status and schooling. 20 It is assumed that firms aim at maximizing profits under technological constraints conditions imposed by production function, in an environment where prices of inputs, production factors (labor and capital) and output are beyond their control. Therefore, as a result of this maximization, for each type of workers, a specific demand curve is defined by the condition that their marginal productivities equalize their wages:
This research uses a CGE model integrated to a MS model. In the last, each individual chooses between offering or not his workforce in the labor market after comparing the observed wage in his sector to his reservation wage. Thus, the labor supply by type of worker is generated by the MS model and communicated to the CGE model, where it is exogenous. 18 Unskilled informal (L1), skilled informal (L2), formal with low skill (L3), formal with average skill (L4), formal with high skill (L5), public servant with low skill (L6) and public servant with high skill (L7). 19 The SAM used in this research is fully described and documented by , which can be requested by e-mail with the authors. 20 The labor treatment that follows is applied for the five types of private workers. The two types of public servants follow the traditional labor market closure of CGE models with either wage or employment being fixed. Therefore, there is no substitution between public servants and the private kinds of workers, in the sectors where there is no public companies. In the sectors where public and private firms coexist, the changes in the public-private composition of labor are related to the changes in the public-private composition of the sectoral representative firm. 21 The derivative of the profit function with relation to the factor demand must be equal to the factors' price (first order condition).
, is the excess of labor supply that corresponds to the involuntary unemployment level (U) in the economy.
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It deserves to be mentioned that the CGE model takes the assumption that this market equilibrium mechanism does not describe the adjustments for the two types of public servants considered in the model. In Brazil, in general, public servants are hired by mean of official examination for a governmental post and their working contract includes a job stability clause in Brazil. Therefore, it is assumed that the employment levels of these workers are fixed and that the disequilibria in their labor markets are adjusted by means of changes in wages.
The labor market closure is not formulated by sector, but rather by type of labor. Then, the adjustment mechanism is from the aggregate to the sectoral level. After an economic shock, first are defined the aggregate levels of labor supply, wages and unemployment for each type of labor by the interaction of their aggregate demand and supply curves, as explained earlier.
To obtain the employ-ment and wage levels in each sector, it is assumed that the sectoral differentiation of wages remain the same as in the base year, which implies in sectoral imperfect segmentation in the labor market.
The hypothesis implicit in the adopted mechanism is that workers with similar observed productive characteristics (schooling and contract status) are paid in a different way according to their sector of employment. The idea is to capture the fact that, although the abovementioned similarities, the workers have another characteristics such as profession type and sector specific training or qualifications that do not permit their free mobility between all sectors but also do not completely constrain their mobility to some other sectors. Therefore, the wage differentials among sectors remain constant due to the imperfect mobility of workers between the economic sectors. Pinheiro and Ramos (1995) have not only proven this fact but have also demonstrated that the wage differentials among sectors are stable along the time. In this sense, there is imperfect mobility of workers among sectors and, thus, the sectoral wage differentials will not be changed, that is, the wage equalization among sectors cannot be achieved by the migration of workers from sector(s) paying lower wages to sector(s) paying higher wages. 
The Income Transfer Mechanisms
This section presents the formation process of income flows received by families and firms. The remuneration of capital is paid to firms and the labor earnings to workers. In each sector, the payments to capital are distributed to the firms according to their initial share in the total earnings of capital.
The eight types (h) of families receive earnings from the seven types (l) of labor according to the initial shares (ε hl ) of these workers in these families, which also receive the income transferred by firms 
The Government
The Government spends by consuming ( ∑ i i CG ) and transferring resources to the economic agents. It plays a very important role in the process of determination of secondary income, once it directs a share of its transfers to firms as interests on the domestic debt and also demands products. Similar to families, the sharing of government transfers to the types of firms follows the proportions in the base year (θ k ). Finally, it also transfers resources to abroad (GE) and its total expenditure is:
To face all expenditures, the Government relies on three types of collections: (1) direct taxes levied on firms' and families' income (φ h and φ k , respectively), and (2) indirect taxes on domestic and imported goods (proportional to production (X), domestic sales (D), imports (M) and value added (VA) 24 Equation 2.1 in the Appendix A. 25 The firms are classified in small (self-employed people) and large (other firms). The large firms transfer interest, dividends and others, and house rental to families. 26 These transfers include the social security benefits as well as other programs such as unemployment benefits, income transfer social programs and other cash benefits. amounts). Besides these sources, it also receives transfers from abroad (gfbor) and, finally, there is the balance of the social security system (SOCBAL).
27 Thus, the Government total revenue is:
where η i are the tax rates on production, ξ i and π i are, respectively, the sector i's PIS-COFINS rates on domestic sales value (cumulative regime) and on value-added (non-cumulative regime), i σ and κ i are, respectively, the ICMS-IPI tax rates on value-added and imports, µ i is the tariff on imports, while γ i are the PIS-COFINS rates on imports of commodity type i.
An eventual lack of government resources is defined as a government deficit that, together with domestic private (firms and families) and foreign savings, defines the amount of resources spent as investments.
The indirect tax revenue (INDTAX) from domestically produced goods is given by:
where PX i * X i is the production value, PD i * D i is the gross revenue value from domestic sales and VA i , η j , ξ i , σ i and π i were presented in equation (3.1.4).
The other equation that contributes to the Government revenue and deserves to be mentioned is the one describing the indirect taxes on imports revenue, which is given by:
where pwm i is the external price of imports (in US$), µ i is the tariff on imports, κ i is ICMS-IPI rates on Imports and γ i are the PIS-COFINS rates on imports.
The Microsimulation Model
This section describes the specification of the household income model used for the microsimulation. The initial hypothesis for using a microsimulation model is the fact that the public income transfers can induce changes of individuals' behavior, concerning their willingness to participate in the job market and their level of expenditure. The application of a microsimulation model will permit to evaluate the effects of the programs Bolsa Família and BPC on the individual's willingness to supply labor, and also on poverty and income distribution indicators, considering a nationally representative sample of the population.
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The microsimulation model adopted in this research is based on the procedure proposed by Savard (2003) . The main adaptation for this model will be the use of another segmented labor market.
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As described before, we will assume five segments with flexible wage that adjusts with labor supply and demand. For the unemployed, the reservation wage of each individual determines its potential choice between offering (or not) his workforce in the labor market. Furthermore, a worker decides to quit the job market if the observed wage is lower than his reservation wage.
The procedure used to estimate the microsimulation model is applied to individuals in active age (over 10 years old) belonging to the five type of factors (L1 to L5) that have the wages paid in the private sector as the main source of income. Once in Brazil the public servants' (factors L6 and L7) working contract includes a job stability clause, it is assumed that their employment levels are fixed.
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A prior concern to the individuals' reservation wage estimation is the issue related to labor supply identification problem. In principle, the enlargement of income transfers exogenously affects the willingness to supply labor of various demographic groups in different ways. Thus, it is necessary to estimate an equation for individual labor supply, identified by the number of individuals' worked hours, as a function of the individual wage-hour after changes in income transfers, for each demographic group to be considered. Besides, it is also necessary to correct the potential auto-selection bias to labor supply participation. After applying this procedure, it is possible to properly identify the different reaction of the labor supply to exogenous changes of transfers' level, for individuals in each demographic group. Therefore, the estimation procedure can be described in two steps as follow.
•
Step 1 The predicted working hours are obtained from the observed and non-observed individuals' characteristics, as well as the family H's characteristics, to which this individual belongs to, and his own 28 As the database used in this work, the National Research of Sample by Domicile (PNAD) doesn't have information about the domicile's expenditures, the micro simulation model will be reduced to the analyzes of the individual's labor offer. See appendix B for further details. 29 In Savard (2003) , the labor market is segmented in two types: one with a fixed wage and another one with a flexible wage. Therefore, an individual could alter between three states (observing the implicit costs of choosing each one of them): offering her workforce in each one of the two markets or getting unemployed by choice. 30 The Brazilian labor market also has a segment of non-flexible wages. However, this segment is formed primarily by public sector workers with job stability clauses. These workers who belong to the factors L6 and L7 are not included in the MS model, but they are agents in the CGE model. wage. Therefore, the worker i's predicted hours of work, j i h , is estimated by the semi-log specification, according to Blundell and McCurdy (1999) : where educ denotes the number of years of schooling, age is a proxy to the level of experience; famsize is the family size in number of individuals (excluding pensioners, domestic servants and their parents), a D is a dummy for the area where the family's domicile is located (0 for urban and 1 for rural).
The individual working hour is observed just for occupied people. Thus, the sample of individuals that present a strictly positive hour of work is not random. However, it is possible that the choice to work be related to the income dependent variables, either from labor or non-labor (other income sources). Therefore, the situation is typically one of endogenous selection, in which there is a decision to participate or not in the job market and, given that the individual had decided to work, it is necessary to determine how many working hours he will offer. In order to control the potential selection bias, it will be applied the procedure proposed by Heckman (1979) , which consists of:
31 This functional form was proposed because it is consistent, first, with the existence of individuals' preferences by labor and leisure, and, second, with the presence of households budgets constraints (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999 .2) is extracted the inverse of Mills' ratio, ( ) γ λ z , which will be applied in equation (3.2.1), in a way that the parameters of this equations are going to be consistently estimated.
After the estimation of the coefficients in (3.2.1) and the inverse of Mills' ratio, it will be possible to estimate the adjusted working hour of each individual, •
Step 2 In accordance with the formulated hours of work model, the individual labor supply is a function of individual market wage rates and the non-labor income among other variables. These wage rates can be observed for paid employed individuals. For non-paid persons there is a unobservable wage rate which an individual could receive in potential. According to Heckman (1974) it is possible to express this reservation (potential) wage as a function of their individual characteristics as well as the non-labor income and other constraints.
Following Savard (2003) , the non-observed reservation wage is obtained from the observable and non-observable individuals' characteristics, as well as the family H's characteristics, of which this individual belongs to. Due to the importance of evaluating the reservation wage before and after a income transfer shock, we include de non-labor income in the structural reservation wage equation and identifying separately the income transfer variable. Therefore, the worker i's reservation log wage, i w , is estimated by the equation: Due to the impossibility of observing the wage offer to the sample's individuals that are unemployed, we need to estimate a probit model that determines the probability of the individual to take part in the labor market. This probability,
, is estimated by the function:
where: Φ is a function of accumulated distribution; i γ is a vector of estimated parameters that determine the probability of the individual to take part in the labor market; as before, i Z and i Y are respectively the individual characteristics and the work and non-work income that determine the probability of participating in the labor market; and g D is a demographic dummy (0 for man, 1 for woman that is mother and head of family, 2 for the other women).
Finally, the equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) are estimated by the two stages method proposed by Heckman (1979) . In this model, equation ( estimates of the ones that these people could earn in the market according to characteristics of themselves and of their families. Therefore, just the application of the Heckman procedure to the database changes the occupational level for each labor type.
As proposed by Savard (2003) , the selection of individuals who should be unemployed starts with the classification of workers according to their reservation wages. Those with the highest reservation wage will be the first to become unemployed if the real wage decreases. If there is positive change in the real wages, the first to be employed will be those with lower reservation wage.
Integration Between The CGE and The MS model
The impacts of the Bolsa Família and BPC programs on welfare indicators will be assessed with an integrated CGE-MS modeling framework with bi-directional linkage between them to guarantee convergence of solutions for both models. The communication between the CGE and MS models will occur by means of wages and occupational level of labor. This sub-section describes the way these models are integrated to generate a convergent solution for them. This iterative process continues until the difference between the values of occupational levels for the private labor types in the CGE model between two consecutive iterative steps are very close to zero.
The following description illustrates the bidirectional procedure works in the case of simulating the implementation of changes in the Bolsa Família and BPC programs according to each simulation, which will be described in the next section:
Step 1 The MS model contains data about thousands of individuals and estimates the reservation wage 
Lsl
. 34 The model's numeraire is the nominal exchange rate.
• Step 2
The occupational level after implementing the changes of income transfer programs ( ) Besides, the new values of taxes that are used to finance the changes in transfer programs ( ) * B are also applied to the CGE model in order to simulate the changes in the economic environment induced by the variation in the income transfer programs.
All these changes will induce the economic system to achieve a new general equilibrium and, as part of this process, the labor market will reach equilibrium with new values for the real wage ( ) * CGE W for each kind of worker.
• Step 3
The percentage change in the average real wage ( ) Therefore, after classifying the workers by the reservation wages, those with the highest reservation wage will be the first to become unemployed if the real wage decreases, and in the case of a positive change in real wages, the first to be employed will be those with lower reservation wage.
Summing up the number of people to be employed or unemployed according to this criterion to the initial occupational level, one obtains a new level of occupation for each private labor type ( ) * MS Lsl .
• Step 4
These new levels of occupational levels are then transmitted to the CGE model, as shown in the This association is done in a consistent way with the equilibrium of aggregate markets in the CGE model, which requires that: (1) relative changes in average earnings in the MS model must be equal to changes in wage rates obtained in the CGE model for each private wage group in the labor market; (2) relative changes in the number of privatly waged workers by labor market segment in the MS model must match those same changes in the CGE model, and (3) changes in the consumption price vector, p, must be consistent with the CGE equivalent price indicator.
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According to the above procedure, the private labor supply is being modified along simulation iterations and for example, some individuals will be losing their former jobs. If this happens, the share of each household in the total income of each labor category can also change (parameter εhl in equation 3.1.2). In order to capture those variations, we incorporate the differences among the parameter εhl, along the simulation rounds, as also a shock in the CGE, which performs together with the procedures described in this section.
Non-Labor Income Procedures
After the models solutions' convergence it is still necessary to treat the non-labor incomes before calculating poverty and inequality indicators. Basically, the variables related to these sources of income in the MS model or follow the CGE variations or held the same value of the household survey, as 35 The change in consumption prices is transmitted from the CGE model to the MS model through the variation of the real wages by worker type, which are used as linking aggregate variables between the models. described in the table bellow. In the former case, the changes from the CGE model are transmitted to the correspondent variables in the MS model in a unidirectional way. (See Table 3 .1 in the Appendix C).
Simulations and Results
This section presents the simulations features in order to provide some basis for a better understanding the reported results which are also presented bellow.
Simulations description
The aiming of this section is the description of the simulations carried out in this project which The effects of abovementioned changes will be evaluated by the simulations henceforth referred as SIMU A and SIMU B. The only difference between them is if the programs are financed or not, before the shock. In the SIMU A, the government expenditure in transfers is not financed and government just increases its expenditure in transfers.
Program Budget Finance at SIMU B. The expenditure increase of BF and BPC was fully financed by the increase in federal government taxes. This choice was made in order to hold almost constant the nominal Government deficit and its contribution to the total amount of savings, at the CGE level. The justification for this policy arrangement can be explained by the "fiscal responsibility law", which requires that every new expenditures must be explicitly financed at the budget law, which means at the moment the law is approved but before the expenditure occurrence.
For the choice of which tax we should increase, we made an extensive research in the 2005 federal budget data to identify the specific tax sources that were financing the BF-BPC programs in that year. The Table 4 .2 in the Appendix C shows the amounts of the federal tax sources, their participation and the equivalent CGE tax, presented in the CGE model.
37
From the Table 4 .2, we collected the financial share of each tax in the total increase of programs expenditure. Thus, the taxes below were increased to finance the programs in the following way:
• 2.2% increase of direct income taxes of all types of families (IR);
• 2.2 % increase of direct income taxes of the model firms (IR);
• It was made an appropriation of 27.5% from the tax increase due to the PIS-COFINS tax reform, which was implemented in the same period and is fully described by . Table 4 .3 in the Appendix C presents the macro results that formed the background for SIMU A and SIMU B. The analysis will focus on results from SIMU A once it captures the effects of changes in transfers and in the taxes that were used to finance the variation in transfers, while the results from SIMU A are reported to provide information on the impacts only from the changes in transfer programs.
Macroeconomic Impacts
In general, the impacts were adverse since they induced a real GDP fall of 0.46%, an aggregate employment decrease of 0.48% and generated a price index increase of 0.65%. These effects can be 37 A more comprehensive data about tax sources is presented in the appendix D of this report.
mainly attributed to the partial PIS-COFINS tax reform that was one of the financing sources of these programs. The analysis of this tax reform done by provided similar results.
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The taxation of the firms' value-added (VA) imposed to firms the need of earning higher marginal revenues or reducing marginal costs, which can be done by reductions of the VA components usage. This implies in a lower labor demand that induces decrease in wages, and so, reduces the available income. Particularly, the consumption fall is due to the decrease in the overall family income despite the rise in the poorest ones due to the transfer's increase.
The taxation of imports imposed by the fiscal reform increased their prices in the domestic market and induced another adverse effect on aggregate consumption, once this have risen the composite commodities prices in the internal market. This relative increase of prices in the internal market induces reductions of the households and firms demands.
Exports fell due to the price-responsiveness behavior of external agents and the model external closure characteristics. First, the simulation induced an increase in domestically produced commodities prices, which, by its turn, caused a decrease in external demand for Brazilian commodities. Second, the rise in import prices and the reduction of internal absorption (activity) induced a fall in demand for imported commodities, and in exports, in order to cause no disequilibrium in the trade balance.
The government deficit worsened 7.88% showing that the simulated taxation changes were not enough to completely finance the total transfer costs. However, comparing with SIMU A, this deficit decreased from 17.87 % to 7.88%. Despite the intention of fully finance in SIMU B design, this deficit was not held constant due to the tax deadweight losses incurred during the simulation.
Finally, the comparison between both simulations can demonstrated the isolated effect of transfers without the tax increases (SIMU A). At this simulation, the GDP is practically stable. The same occurred with internal absorption, but the shock caused a trade off between consumption and the investment, with the former increasing 0.5 % and the later decreasing 1.42 %. This fact can be explained by the increase in income transfer and by the higher public deficit (+17.89 %) and consequently, reducing total savings.. If there is no increase in another source of savings, the consequently fall of Investment can reduce the rate of economic growth in the near future.
Besides the former adverse effect, overall the SIMU A almost doesn't change the macro indicators in the short run, therefore we can conclude that the adverse impacts of SIMU B are due to the implemented financing structure.
Impacts on Labor Market
The changes of transfer programs from 2003 to 2005 induced a slight adverse effects on aggregate employment (-0.48%, see Table 4 .3) and on employment by labor type, as shown in Table 4 .4
in the Appendix C. The results show that employment would fall for all categories of workers in the private sector only. The public servants employment does not change because public sector does not follow the behavior of private sector concerning hiring/firing people and so, by assumption, their employment levels are fixed and their labor market adjust only by means of wages.
Among workers in the private sector, one can see two patterns. First, the effects would be more pronounced among those allocated in the informal market (L1 and L2) and, second, among the less skilled ones in each (informal or formal) market.
In our interpretation, with lower imports and an external closure implying fixed balance of goods and services there will be a pressure to overvalue the exchange rate that will tend to make exports more expensive, which will be reinforced by an increase in input prices used to produce exported goods. The sectors in which exports are more sensible to price changes are the most traditional ones. Thus, by exporting less, there would be a tendency for these sectors to produce less and, therefore, to employ less workers, especially the less skilled ones.
The decrease in employment of more skilled workers is due to the fall in the output of sectors that produce goods with higher technological content and demand this kind of worker in a more intensive way (automobiles, auto parts, electronic, electrical, and pharmaceutical). Behind this fact , probably there is the consumption fall of families with higher income. Table 4 .5 in the Appendix C presents the impacts on real wages by labor type. Recall that the CGE model takes the assumption of rigid sectoral wage differentials, and, thus, the wage structure can only react to the type of labor. As a consequence, the changes reported in Table 4 .5, are for each type of worker without any sectoral desegregation.
Note that the general effect is a real wage fall. The wage of informal workers (L1 and L2) would fall relatively more comparing to the wage of formal workers with similar level of skills. The higher reduction of public servants' earnings is due to the assumption that the equilibrium in their labor market is almost exclusively achieved by means of wages adjustments. Table 4 .6 in the Appendix C shows that the effects on payroll by type of worker (total labor income) representing the former quantity and price effects together. They are stronger among the less skilled workers, especially for those allocated in informal market.
These effects on payroll are due mainly to the falls in real wages, once the impacts of changes in transfer programs on employment are lower than the ones on real wages for each kind of worker. Again, the comparison between the simulations shows that the transfer programs themselves practically don't cause any significant adverse effect. Even the informal unskilled worker (L1) shows a labor income improvement, derived from the fact that there is a production reallocation in favor of more intensive labor sectors. On the other hand, the increase in taxes to finance the programs brought the adverse effects through the changes in the relative prices and a less efficient resource allocation with higher unemployment.
Finally, it is important to mention that the convergence procedures affect the final labor market equilibrium. Thus, concerning these effects on payroll, the convergence solution of the CGE and the MS models show that the changes in the transfer programs induce general equilibrium effects that are firstly concentrating on wage (price effects) and along the iterative process are partially reallocated to employment impacts (quantity effects).
The Table 4 .7 in the Appendix C illustrates the process described in the previous paragraph through the evolution of model variables during the simulation B. In the first line, we represent the real wage, price index and GDP in the first simulation round. In the second line, the same variables are presented for the last round of SIMU B, which is the source of the results reported in this section. For the wage, we realized that the iteration change considerably the results, lowering the impact on wages. The price index received an increase and GDP just a small variation, helped by the employment increase, confirming that the model integration leads a new set of results. Table 4 .8 in the Appendix C shows the impacts of changes in transfer programs on inequality indicators. In general, the results confirm the important role of these programs in the Brazilian recent inequality fall. 39 Focusing on Gini index changes, the fall of -0.48% is slightly lower than ones reported by other studies that have evaluated the importance of transfer programs to the decrease in inequality using partial equilibrium/decomposing analysis. Barros et al (2007) found that 22.9 % of the total Gini decrease between 2001 and 2005 was due to BF and BPC.
Impacts on Income Distribution
The simulations implemented in this research had isolated the effects of changes in transfer programs from 2003 to 2005. In the same period, the before mentioned authors reported a total decrease 39 The book printed in Brazil, edited by IPEA (Barros et al, 2007) has several chapters aligned with this view.
of Gini index of -2.6%. Therefore, the decrease displayed in the Although the period is different, we found evidences that just the transfer programs (SIMU A) had lower effects on inequality than those reported by other studies that had evaluated the distributive effects of these programs. But, in the case of SIMU B, the effect is very similar. It is important to observe that the taxation changes related to the programs contributed in a significant way to reduce inequality.
Despite the previous comments, we must be careful when comparing with former analysis. As stressed before, they have methodological differences and design of the simulations is not the same, although we tried to replicate their experiments. Table 4 .9 in the Appendix C shows the impacts of changes in transfer programs on per head family income. Before presenting these results, it deserves mention that the changes in programs had slight adverse effect on the national average household income of -0.18% (SIMU A), which was magnified to -0.81%, when the changes in taxation related to the programs expansion were considered (SIMU B). At both simulations, the positive strong effects in the three poorest families are primarily due to the increase of the transfer amounts for them. But at SIMU B, the effects are a little lower for each of these same families type. This happens because one of the main sources of resources for the enlargement of the programs was the increase in income taxes that does not charge them.
For the same reason previously mentioned, the effects of programs expansion on income of richer families (F7 and F8) already were negative in the first simulation (SIMU A) and were magnified when the changes in taxation were considered.
SIMU A captures the effects just of the transfer programs expansion that positively impacts the income of the poorest family types. This simulation also captures the systemic effects induced from these programs that were generally adverse, as shown in sections 4.2 and 4.4. Besides capturing these effects, SIMU B also captures the additional negative impacts from taxation on all families, mainly on the richest ones (F7 and F8).
This helps to understand the improvement of the Gini index at SIMU B, in relation to SIMU A, because besides capturing the increase of income of the poorest families, it also captures the fall of income of the richest families due to the taxation.
Impacts on Poverty
The effects of the transfer programs on poverty are presented in the Table 4 .10 in the Appendix C. Based on observed and simulated per head household income, we calculate three poverty indicators:
Proportion of Poor (P0), Income Gap (P1) and Severity of Poverty (P2 The general reduction in poverty indicators (P0, P1 and P2) show that the changes just in transfer programs (SIMU A) had positive effects on poverty and on extreme poverty. Although the impacts are positive, they are lower than the income of the poorest families showed at Table 4 .9 because the transfers are concentrated on the families that receive them and on the other hand, some poor families loose their labor income due to the unemployment generated in the economy
From the results on the table above, we also see that the impacts of programs on poverty were reduced by the changes in taxation conducted to finance their expansion (SIMU B), that is, the changes in taxation generated some adverse impacts in the markets that affected the poor population and in a more intensive way, the extremely poor individuals. As we have seen previously in section 4.4, the impacts on employment were stronger among the less skilled workers (L1 and L3) and for the informal workers (L1 and L2). Despite these workers have not presented the highest reduction in wages, their wages also have decreased in a significant way. These workers are the prevailing types in the poorest families, which also present a high dependence on the labor income. Therefore, despite the increase of the received benefits, some families experienced adverse effects from job losses and from wage reduction that were induced by the changes in taxation.
Specifically in the case of SIMU B, the extreme poverty level was not affected by the programs expansion. However, the income gap and severity of extreme poverty have worsened. One fact that helps to understand, besides what was pointed before, is the deterioration of`non-labor income due to the prices increase, which especially hammered the family F2, whose income is basically from Social Security benefits.
Conclusions and Recommendations
In the last two sections of this paper, we presented the methodological approach and the main results of the simulations. In these previous analysis it became very clear the interdependence of both to achieve the main objectives stated in this research project: "The Impacts of Income Transfer Programs
on Income Distribution and Poverty in Brazil: An Integrated Microsimulation and Computable General
Equilibrium Analysis".
From the methodology, the general equilibrium effects can not be neglected, not only to evaluate the effects brought by the transfer increases, but mainly to address the economic impacts originated in the tax structure that finances this social expenditure. Without the CGE part of the integrated approach, many economic facts, reported at the simulation results, could not be identified.
On the other hand, the MS model allows the individualization and the treatment of individuals and families. In view of this, we implemented the individual imputation of the transfer benefits and the respective labor supply reaction, whose system inside the MS model improved a lot the treatment of the labor market. Also, without the MS model, we could not generate more realistic results about poverty and inequality than those obtained with models with representative agents.
Then, we have the integration between these models (CGE and MS). Throughout the interaction in the labor market, the employee's reactions to wage movements were better captured allowing a set of price and quantity adjustments with economic consequences for the entire system. Without them, the simulations effects would be more concentrated on quantity adjustments that rarely fit the empirical data of this type of shock.
The aiming of the simulations presented before was the investigation of the role of the two most important Brazilian cash transfer programs in reducing inequality. Through them our main objective was to provide information that could help on the answers of the main project research questions: What are the impacts of the current income transfer programs on poverty/inequality? In which extent each of them is accomplishing its objective of poverty/inequality reduction? Which would be the impacts of these programs if they have alternative policy designs?
Adopting the same strategy of our results presentation, we will emphasize the impacts of SIMU B, which in our opinion can represent better the cost-benefits of the analyzed policies, since it captures the effects of changes in transfers and in taxes that were used to finance them.
The macro results that formed the background for both simulations showed that, in general, the impacts were adverse for several macro indicators, among them, GDP, employment and price index.
However, it is important to emphasize that the adverse results came mainly from the tax increases instead of the transfer policies. Also, the identification of this fact is a direct contribution of the integrated approach.
Starting with the first question, the results confirm the importance of "Bolsa Família" and "BPC"
programs for the recent reduction of Brazilian income inequality. The results of SIMU B showed that practically 1/5 of inequality fall, between 2003 and 2005, can be attributed to the adopted policies. Also, the results are very similar of those reported by other studies that used partial equilibrium/decomposing analysis. However, the taxation alone, showed in SIMU B, had a major role in this process. Again, this finding is another contribution derived from our methodology.
For the poverty indicators, the results are also positive but the transfer policy contribution, especially at SIMU B, had a smaller impact than its inequality effect. The transfers itself (SIMU A) generated the positive impacts, but the changes in taxation to finance their expansion practically offset the former effect, particularly, in the case of extreme poverty indicators. The family income components that contributed to this process are both, the labor income through a higher unemployment and the non labor income through the fall of social security benefits, in real values.
The answer of the second question, if the programs are accomplishing their objective of poverty/inequality reduction, can not ignore the analysis pointed out before. Generally, the results demonstrate that the two analyzed programs have achieved their objectives. But, the simulation data at section 4.1 showed that "Bolsa Família" has a better focalization for their beneficiaries, concentrating its benefits in the poor families. On the other hand, BPC doesn't show the same concentration pattern.
However, in this case, as shown in the appendix C and D, the main problem lies in the program administration that has not enforced correctly the criteria established by its legal instruments.
Finally, for the third question, we didn't formally made simulations with the alternative designs because the research results indicated there are other issues more important than the benefits alternative models. This fact was also reinforced by the small impacts of the current programs design on labor supply. On the other hand, it became evident that the taxation structure of the transfer programs has an important role in the final welfare impacts. In our opinion, this issue should deserve more attention in the research policy agenda which could explore different strategies to finance the programs and/or cutting some government expenditure that neither improves income distribution nor reducing poverty. 
A.2. The CGE Model

A.2.1. The Product Supply
Foreign product supply is modeled as being totally elastic, 40 while sectoral domestic supply is represented by a three steps nested production function with three types of inputs: labor, capital and intermediate inputs. 
a is the CES shift parameter, i α is the i sector's labor share in the production value and ip ρ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
Finally, in the third step the various intermediate inputs levels (INT i ) are obtained by a Leontief production function (e.g., fixed proportion to sector j total product, X j ):
where a ij is the technical coefficient of input j in sector i.
Domestic producers react to the relative prices in domestic and international markets and the domestic output is divided by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function with imperfect substitution between products sold in these markets:
40 Thus, Brazilian demands for imported goods are fully satisfied without facing external supply constraints. 41 The model represents the 42 sectors of activities listed in the Appendix A.1. 42 This means that an identical increase of every type of worker results in an identical increase of the aggregate worker. 43 Also, there are more two types of employers that are treated as labor and enter in the Cobb-Douglas aggregation. 44 The model closure adopted in the simulations determines that the sectoral levels of capital are fixed. 45 It is worth mentioning that Devarajan et al (1991) They choose commodities' consumption levels to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, 47 according to a Cobb-Douglas functional form (similar to the production function presented earlier).
Families and firms demand domestic and imported goods as imperfect substitutes that differ according to their source (domestic or external), as proposed by Armington (1969) , and their utility levels are measured (in product quantity) by a CES function: indicates the utility derived from the consumption of good i.
49
The external agents demand domestic goods, reacting to changes in relative prices as well. Similarly to the import demand function, the exports demand arises from a CES utility function that represents the imperfect substitution between products from the external regions and Brazil.
A.2.2.2. Firms
Firms demand commodities to satisfy their production requirements of intermediate inputs according to the technical coefficients from the input-output matrix.
Due to the static nature of accumulation in the capital market, investments are only important for product demand. Similarly to consumption, the investment is characterized as the purchases of certain goods and can be considered as a final consumption undertaken by firms. The savings represent this amount of resources and it is assumed that a share of it corresponds to investment in stocks of finished goods, while the remaining parcel represents the net investment required to expand production. The first share is 46 There are no empirical estimates of Brazilian export elasticities using a CET structure for a highly disaggregated sectoral specification. Therefore, it was adopted the same procedure used in Cury (1998, pp. 112-113) , which departed from the elasticities estimated by Roland-Holst et al (1994) to the American economy. 47 Actually, this utility maximization can happen along the consumers' lifetime. From the point of view of most practical applications, the maximization is on the goods and services available in a given period. 48 These elasticities values were estimated for the same sectors considered in the model by Tourinho et al (2002) .
defined based on a fixed proportion to the sectoral output, while the second is distributed exogenously among the sectors, reflecting information from the input-output tables (goods by sector of origin).
It is considered that investment goods are being produced but not used as increments of capital stocks.
Thus, the model closure is closer to a medium-run type: constant capital stock, price flexibility and existence of involuntary unemployment in equilibrium.
A.2.2.3. Government
The Government consumption (GC) is derived from maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to the budgetary constraint corresponding to the total expenditure that is fixed according to the total amount registered for the base year.
49 It can be interpreted as the quantity of a hypothetical composite good that would be demanded by consumers. One of the main difficulties in order to make the CGE-MS integration is the convergence. For this convergence be successful it was appropriate to make the two databases had the same values. Thus, the weights of individuals were multiplied by a factor (reweighting), so as the PNAD data base reflected the CGE model data. 
B.3. Econometric Estimates
The first part of the micro simulation process is the computation of the labor supply equation. For this phase, it was considered the entire PNAD sample. From the reweighed data base, it was estimated the equations (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) by the two stages method proposed by Heckman (1979) , for three demographics groups: men, women head of household with children, and other women. Table B.2 contains the econometric estimates by the system equation, including the coefficients and their standard errors to 5% of significance, as well as the inverse of the Mills's ratio, ( ) z λˆ. From these estimates were computed the potential hours of work necessary for the completion of the step 2 of the microsimulation process.
The second part of the micro simulation process is the computation of the reservation wages and the new occupation ratio. For this phase, it was considered only the factors L1 to L5. From the reweighed data base, it was estimated the equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) by the two stages method proposed by Heckman (1979) . 
B.4. Labor Supply Elasticities
In this section, we evaluate the relations between the conditional cash transfer programs and the individual work decision through the substitution and income effects. In Table 4 .10 we present the marginal effects in respect to hours of work, implied by the estimates in Table B .2 presented in Appendix B.
The wage compensated elasticity of labor supply reflects the strength of the substitution effect from the labor income. The wage elasticities are the coefficients reported by the variable w log in equation (3.2.1). For women without children (j = 3) this elasticity is positive and higher than women head of families (j = 2), as we would expect and according to the results of many empirical studies. For men, the negative elasticity is not usual, but its result is non-significant.
The magnitude of the income effect is reflected in the income elasticity of labor supply. These income elasticities − described by the variables B log (public transfer benefits) and Q log (all other non labor income) in equation (3.2.1) − are all negative, as expected. The highest sensibility is related to the group formed by women, head of households, with children which is in line with the great majority of the empirical works on this subject. Also, the results are consistent with the standard theory and show that the cash benefits may have participation effects on the specific population groups. Note: L1-unskilled informal; L2-skilled informal; L3-formal with low skill; L4-formal with average skill; L5-formal with high skill; L6-low skilled public servant; L7-highly skilled public servant. Note: L1-unskilled informal; L2-skilled informal; L3-formal with low skill; L4-formal with average skill; L5-formal with high skill; L6-low skilled public servant; L7-highly skilled public servant. Note: L1-unskilled informal; L2-skilled informal; L3-formal with low skill; L4-formal with average skill; L5-formal with high skill; L6-low skilled public servant; L7-highly skilled public servant. 
